Extended abstract in EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
New version coming soon Abstract: I study a class of finite-action disclosure games where the sender's payoff is state independent and the receiver's optimal action depends solely on the expected state. In such games, the receiver's preferred equilibria feature full revelation of the state, but other equilibria are less well-studied. I show that a sender's preferred equilibrium balances the frequencies of recommending sender-favorable actions with deterring deviation to full revelation by pooling nonadjacent states in a particular way. Leveraging this observation, I characterize other equilibria of the game and the sender's equilibrium payoff set, and identify conditions under which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. I apply these insights to study influencing voters and selling with quality disclosure.Math bootcamp for incoming graduate students
Lecture notes: Logic and Set Theory; Real Analysis; Optimization.